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ABSTRACT:   
 
The aim of this paper is to analyze whether Spanish municipalities adjust in response to 
budget shocks and (if so) which elements of the budget they are more likely to adjust. 
The methodology we use to answer these questions is a vector error-correction model 
(VECM), estimated with data from a panel of Spanish municipalities during the period 
1988-2006. Our results confirm, first, that municipalities do indeed make adjustments in 
response to fiscal shocks (i.e., the deficit is stationary in the long run). Second, we find 
that most of the adjustment to a revenue shock is borne by the municipalities themselves 
as they proceed to cut expenditures, with a minor role being played by grant financing. 
By contrast, adjustments to expenditure shocks are shared on largely equal terms by the 
municipality –through the raising of taxes– and higher tiers of government –through the 
raising of grants. These results suggest that the viability of the local finance system is 
feasible with different institutional arrangements. 
 
RESUMEN:  
 
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar si los municipios españoles se ajustan en 
presencia de un shock presupuestario y (si es así) qué elementos del presupuesto son los 
que realizan el ajuste. La metodología utilizada para contestar estas preguntas es un 
mecanismo de corrección del error (VECM), que estimamos con un panel de datos de 
los municipios españoles durante el período 1988-2006. Nuestros resultados confirman 
que, en primer lugar, los municipios se ajustan en presencia de un shock fiscal (es decir, 
el déficit es estacionario en el largo plazo). En segundo lugar, obtenemos que cuando el 
shock afecta a los ingresos el ajuste lo soporta principalmente el municipio reduciendo 
el gasto, las transferencias tienen un papel muy reducido en este proceso de ajuste. Por 
el contrario, cuando el shock afecta al gasto, el ajuste es compartido en términos 
similares entre el municipio – incrementado los impuestos – y los gobiernos de niveles 
superiores – incrementando las transferencias. Estos resultados sugieren que la 
viabilidad de las finanzas pública locales es factible con diferentes entornos 
institucionales. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Local governments deliver a range of public services that have a strong impact on a 
community’s quality of life. In most countries, they are responsible for refuse collection 
and recycling, water delivery and sewerage, street lighting and maintenance, public 
transportation, capital improvement construction, police, planning and land use 
regulations, and recreational and cultural facilities and programs. In some places, they 
are also involved in the provision of education, health and social services. Many 
scholars and international organizations currently advocate the virtues of the provision 
of these services by sub-national governments and, in particular, by local governments 
(see, e.g., the contributions in Brosio et al., 2009). However, there is less agreement as 
to how these local services should be funded. Traditional advice from ‘fiscal 
federalism’ scholars (see, e.g., Oates, 1972) recommends relying primarily on property 
taxes and user charges, but the U.S. experience with the imposition of property tax 
limitations has demonstrated the problems associated with this approach (e.g., Downes 
et al., 1998; Bradbury, 2001). And yet, other major taxes (e.g., income taxes) are often 
inappropriate given the size of local governments, and so the solution in the end is 
either the decentralization of minor and inefficient taxes or grant financing.  
 
In these circumstances, such intergovernmental transfers serve to attenuate the 
inefficiencies of local tax systems and may help smooth spending and tax policy (Sala-
i-Martin and Sachs, 1992, von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996). However, recent studies 
also emphasize the perils of grant financing. First, grants can create a moral-hazard 
problem, with local governments, aware that intergovernmental grants provide 
insurance against budget shocks, pursuing overly risky policies (Persson and Tabellini, 
1997). Second, grants might soften the local budget constraint (e.g., Wildasin, 1997; 
Rodden, 2000; Inman, 2001), creating incentives to run up excessive deficits that local 
governments expect to be covered by future grants. Third, grant financing may diffuse 
accountability (Rodden, 2000) and foster rent-seeking and clientelism (Devarajan et al., 
2009), thus eroding the very benefits gained from spending decentralization. With its 
virtues and perils, any final evaluation of grant financing has to be country specific, 
with the system depending on the particular details of the whole local government 
financing system (see, e.g., Rodden et al., 2003). This being the case, a promising 
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avenue for research involves evaluating the viability of local finance systems in 
countries with with different institutional arrangements. One way of conducting such an 
evaluation is to analyze whether local government budgets undergo any adjustments 
following a budget shock, and the role that is played by intergovernmental grants in this 
process. In situations where local budgets either do not adjust (so, that the deficit is not 
reverted over time), adjust very slowly, or require massive fiscal assistance in order to 
ensure the adjustment, then there is compelling evidence that the local governmental 
system is not viable unless it receives interventions from the higher tiers of 
government. This research question has been previously addressed by Buettner and 
Wildasin (2005) and Buettner (2007) using data for U.S. and German local 
governments, respectively. Their results suggest that the system is viable in both 
countries, albeit that grants were found to play a more prominent role in the absorption 
of revenue shocks in the German case because of the role played by equalization 
transfers. Buettner (2007) suggests that the high degree of insurance might account for 
the greater reliance in Germany on the volatile local business tax. 
 
In this paper we perform a similar analysis for the Spanish case. A number of specific 
institutional characteristics suggest that Spanish municipalities constitute an interesting 
case study (see Suárez-Pandiello, 1999, for a survey). First, as in the U.S. and 
Germany, the municipalities are responsible for the provision of services traditionally 
assigned to local governments (as cited at the beginning of this paper), but they have 
limited responsibilities in the fields of education, health and social services. Second, 
since the end of the 1980s, Spanish municipalities have been able to modify the tax 
rates of all taxes assigned to them, albeit subject to compulsory minimum tax rates 
(common to all municipalities) and ceilings (which grow with population size), which 
might serve to constrain their responses. The main local taxes are (in the following 
order) a property tax, a business tax, and a motor vehicle tax. These tax bases are quite 
inelastic1, which insures against large revenue shocks during downturns but also against 
                                                 
1 Unlike its German counterpart, Spain’s local business tax (Impuesto sobre Actividades 
Económicas) is a presumptive tax, with a tax base computed using simple indicators of 
economic activity (e.g., surface area, electricity usage, number of workers, sectoral 
classification, see Jofre-Monseny and Solé-Ollé, 2008), which makes it less volatile than the 
German tax. 
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automatic increases during times of boom2. These taxes are considered as being 
inequitable and, therefore, somewhat unpopular, while preventing the municipalities 
from making major short-term adjustments. Third, vertical unconditional transfers 
represent a third of current revenues and are formula-based, but they have a very low 
equalizing power (see, for example, Suárez-Pandiello, 1999; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 
2005). Thus, they are more relevant than in the U.S. case, but they do not share the 
insurance properties of German transfers. Conditional grants play an important role in 
the financing of capital projects (a half of all investments being funded by them). They 
are proportional, closed-ended grants, which are used for funding capital expenditure 
projects proposed by the local government. They very rarely include an equalization 
component, and their allocation is largely discretionary (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro, 2008). Finally, local debt is subject to certain ceilings, involving both the ratio 
between debt and current revenues and the short-term financial position. However, the 
problems entailed in controlling these indicators effectively are enormous, and mean 
that successive Spanish governments have had great room to use deficits to make an 
adjustment3. So, in short, Spanish local governments have similar responsibilities and 
tax possibilities to those enjoyed by the U.S. cities and what would arguably seem to be 
a less volatile tax system than the one operating in Germany. Further, they are not 
subject to explicit equalization grants as their German counterparts are, while they can 
rely to a great extent on transfers to fund investment. 
 
The results of our analysis should show us whether these institutional differences in 
Spain are reflected in different patterns of adjustment to budget shocks to those 
described in these other countries. The methodology we adopt here closely mirrors that 
first developed by Bohn (1991) and applied by Buettner and Wildasin (2006) and 
Buettner (2007) to local governments. To trace the budget adjustment process, we use a 
vector error-correction model (VECM), estimated with panel data drawn from a set of 
                                                 
2 Other local taxes are a construction tax and a tax on land value improvements, which tend to 
become important during housing booms, and as such are quite volatile. This would seem to 
modify our conclusion, therefore, regarding the elasticity of the main taxes. 
 
3 Since 2002, with the enactment of the ‘Budget Stability Law’, the running up of deficits by 
any tier of government is forbidden (i.e., new debt should be used to fund past debt service). 
Compliance with this law, however, has been minimal outside very big cities, with regional 
governments (which are responsible for the overseeing of local debt policies) still applying the 
older rules. 
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Spanish municipalities during the period 1988-20064. Our results confirm, first, that 
municipalities do adjust in response to fiscal shocks (i.e., the deficit is stationary in the 
long run). Second, we find that most of the adjustment to a revenue shock is borne by 
the municipalities themselves –through the cutting of expenditure, with a minor role 
being played by grant financing. By contrast, adjustments to expenditure shocks are 
shared on largely similar terms by the municipality –through the raising of taxes– and 
higher tiers of government –through the raising of grants.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we briefly present 
the analytical framework used here. In the third, we describe the data and the many 
tests performed to ensure the model is correctly specified. In the fourth section, we 
discuss the results and compare them with those obtained previously for other 
countries. In the final section, we conclude. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
The analytical framework employed here is similar to that employed in Buettner and 
Wildasin (2006) and Buettner (2007), who where the first to apply the methods 
previously used by Bohn (1991) and Hjelm (2001) in describing the dynamic fiscal 
adjustment of national governments to local government budgets. This procedure 
models budgetary adjustment to fiscal shocks through a vector error-correction model 
(VECM). If we distinguish the following four budgetary components: own-source 
revenues, Rit, grants, Git, expenditures, Eit, and debt service, DSit, we can express the 
VECM(p), using matrix notation, as follows: 
 
                                                 
4 The model is very similar to the vector autoregression (VAR) used by Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1989) and Dalhberg and Johansson (1998, 2000), the only difference being that the VEC model 
includes the deficit (considered as being stationary) in the estimated equations. Other papers that 
analyze subnational adjustment to fiscal shocks, but adopting different methodologies, include 
those by Poterba (1994), Rattso (1999) and Darby et al. (2005). No such studies have been 
undertaken of the Spanish case. 
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where ( )ititititit GDSERX ,,,= , ( )'1- ,1  ,1 ,1−=φ  and tXφ  is the general deficit.  
 
Since the estimation of the VECM provides a large number of parameters, which are 
difficult to interpret at first sight, we compute the generalized impulse-response 
functions (GIRFs hereinafter), following Pesaran and Shin (1998). Prior to doing this, 
we use the recursive procedure proposed by Lütkepohl and Reimers (1992) to obtain the 
coefficients of the VAR(p+1) in levels derived from the VECM(p) and then the moving 
average (MA) representation of the VAR(p+1). The GIRFs project the response of each 
budgetary component in reaction to a shock, which is either to itself or to any other 
budgetary component. Moreover, the GIRFs consider the historical distribution of the 
residuals. That is, the GIRFs take into account the correlations between the fiscal 
variables and do not assume that if a shock occurs in one fiscal variable everything else 
remains constant. Thus, the GIRFs are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the 
VECM, and thereby overcome the main problem of the traditional IRF5. We summarize 
the information provided by the GIRFs when computing the present value of the fiscal 
adjustment process.  
 
Analytically the GIRF is defined by the following expression: 
 
        ( ) [ ] [ ]1-t1-t1-t IEI,EI,, htkkthtkX XXhGIRF ++ −== δεδ             [2] 
 
where h is the number of periods ahead, kδ  represents a shock to variable k, and It-1 is 
all the information available at the time of the shock. Thus, equation [2] states that the 
GIRF for the vector X, h periods ahead, is the difference in the expected value (E) of 
Xt+h, when taking the shock kδ  into account. Pesaran and Shin (1998) demonstrate that 
                                                 
5 By traditional IRF we refer to the IRF as computed by Sims (1987) and Hamilton (1994). The 
use of the GIRF rather than the IRF constitutes the main methodological difference with respect 
to Buettner and Wildasin (2006) and Buettner (2007). 
 8
if the innovation, ktε , has a normal distribution, ktε ∼ ( )Σ,0 , the GIRF of a δ  shock to 
variable k can be expressed as follows:  
 
          ( ) kkkkhX ehGIRF δσ 11-tI,1, −ΣΦ=                                [3] 
 
where hΦ  is the MA coefficient matrix at t+h, ke  is a m× 1 selection vector, where m is 
the number of endogenous variables, with unity as its kth element and zero elsewhere6.  
 
3. Data and model specification 
 
Data. We use panel data for a 19-year period (1988-2006), including annual budgetary 
information for 258 municipalities in Catalonia, a Spanish region7. As in Buettner and 
Wildasin (2006), to maintain the parsimony of the model, we aggregate the budgetary 
data in four fiscal variables: own-source revenues, itR , grants, itG , expenditures, Eit, 
and debt service, DSit. This decomposition on the revenue side allows us to estimate the 
role of upper tiers of government in the adjustment process. All the variables have been 
deflated and are expressed in per capita terms8. Table 1 reports the definition of the four 
fiscal variables used in the analysis as well as their summary statistics. 
 
 
                                                 
6 We computed the bootstrap standard errors of the coefficients of the GIRFs by conducting 100 
replications with replacement. 
 
7 This information has been provided by the Public Audit Office of Catalonia (Sindicatura de 
Comptes de Catalunya), for the period 1988-2005, and by the Spanish Ministry of Economics 
and Finance, for the final year, 2006. This sample does not include information about the city of 
Barcelona. The initial dataset contained more cross-sectional observations, but some 
municipalities have been removed from the sample owing to the lack of information for certain 
years. Although the sample contains just 256 of the 800 Catalan municipalities, its distribution 
by size does match that of the complete population of municipalities. 
 
8 We have not scaled fiscal variables in terms of income due to the lack of elasticity of the 
municipal revenues in Spain. This is also the scale factor used by Buettner and Wildasin (2006) 
and Buettner (2007). 
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Table 1: Summary statistics and definition of the variables (€ 2006 per capita) 
  Mean St.Dev. Definition1 
     
R Own Revenues 533.988 436.905 Items I, II, III,V and VI of Revenue Budget 
G Grants 346.779 479.534 Items IV and VII of Revenue Budget 
E Expenditures 805.668 627.609 Items I, II, IV, VI and VII of Exp. Budget 
DS Debt service 34.496 73.276 Item III of Expenditure Budget 
     
D Deficit -39.603 403.677 Eit + DSit − Rit − Git 
Note: The definition of the fiscal variables is based in the chapters of the economic classification of the 
budget. Revenues: I: direct taxes; II: indirect taxes; III: user charges; IV: current grants; V: assets’ 
revenues; VI: real investment sales; VII: capital grants. Expenditures: I: wages and salaries; II: purchases 
of goods and services; III: debt service; IV: current grants; VI real investment; VII: capital grants. 
 
Model specification. Before estimating the model, it is important to check whether the 
basic hypothesis of the model holds, i.e., whether each of the fiscal variables in first 
differences as well as the deficit is stationary. We compute the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) unit root statistic, which is a fairly quite standard in the panel data literature and 
it allows for heterogeneous constants and slopes across cross-sections. The statistic is 
distributed standard normal under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Results for the 
variables both in differences and in levels are presented in Table 29. They show that the 
deficit and all the variables when expressed in differences are stationary10. The fact that 
the deficit is stationary is interesting in itself, indicating that the financial arrangements 
of Spanish municipalities ensure that budget adjustments occur after a shock with 
deficits eventually being reverted. In the rest of the paper we investigate how these 
adjustments are made (i.e., which budget components are involved). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Different orders of lag length (p=0,1,2) were used in computing the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) test to allow for serial correlation in the errors.  
 
10 We also report the unit root statistics of the fiscal variables in levels. These statistics show 
that stationarity is accepted for grants and debt service, but that it is rejected for own-source 
revenues and expenditures. 
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Table 2: Unit root test (IPS test) 
 p=0 p=1 p=2 
    
R -0.156 [0.438] 0.032 [0.513] 0.654 [0.743] 
G -8.464 [0.000] -5.565 [0.000] -5.180 [0.000] 
E 7.190 [1.000] 8.129 [1.000] 7.289 [1.000] 
DS -11.973 [0.000] -9.632 [0.000] -9.095 [0.000] 
D -30.529 [0.000] -9.500 [0.000] -5.328 [0.000] 
    
Δ R -79.761 [0.000] -36.531 [0.000] -20.849 [0.000] Δ G -80.438 [0.000] -40.142 [0.000] -19.151 [0.000] Δ E -78.238 [0.000] -41.960 [0.000] -19.597 [0.000] Δ DS -5.014 [0.000] -4.159 [0.000] -3.542 [0.000] 
    
Notes: (1) IPS: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root test, where H0: I(1). Wtbar 
statistic is reported, which allows for serially correlated errors. (2) Tests for 
variables in levels include time effects, except for the deficit. (3) p: number of 
lags of the dependent variable considered in the regression to allow for serial 
correlation in the errors. (4) All tests include a constant. (5) [ ]: P-value. 
 
In ensuring the proper specification of the VECM, the first aspect to consider is the 
optimal lag length of the variables included in the model. The empirical literature has 
shown that the dynamic relationship between local government revenues and 
expenditures mainly takes place in a period of between two to four years (Holtz-Eakin 
et al, 1989; Dahlberg and Johansson, 1998 and 2000). Moreover, Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2000) report that the estimation techniques that are generally adopted tend 
to reject too often a true null of no significance of the lags. Given the size of our sample 
and the empirical evidence, here, in order to specify the lag length of the model, we 
begin with three lags and test for a possible reduction in the number of lags in all the 
equations simultaneously. As the results in Table 3 show, a reduction of the lag length is 
always rejected.  
 
A second aspect of the model specification to consider is whether municipality-fixed 
effects are actually required. There is some theoretical controversy as regards the need 
to include them in the equations, since this would mean that we allow each municipality 
to converge to a different level of deficit, and thus some converge to deficits that are 
different from zero. Here, nevertheless, we decided to test the need to include them in 
the estimation. As shown in Table 3, we reject the presence of municipality-fixed 
effects, which means that all municipalities converge to the same level of deficit11. 
                                                 
11 This test has been performed after estimating the equations by OLS, since the time dimension 
of our sample suggests that the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a major problem. Moreover, 
the performance of the GMM estimator with a relatively small number of municipalities is 
questionable.  
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Thus, each of the equations is estimated by OLS without these municipality-fixed 
effects. We also present some additional results when including year-fixed effects, 
which should control for those budget shocks that are common to all the municipalities 
(see section 4 for interpretation). Finally, each of the four equations has been estimated 
equation by equation. Given that the set of regressors is the same in all the equations, 
this procedure is asymptotically efficient and joint estimation does not improve 
efficiency (Baltagi, 1995). 
 
Table 3: Specification tests 
a.- Municipality-fixed effects? 
 With lag length= 3 With lag length= 2 
   
χ2(1,032)  953.57  [0.961] 857.28  [1.000] 
   
b.- Lag order 
 3→ 2 2→ 1 
χ2(16) 66.94   [0.000] 87.13    [0.000] 
   
Note: (1) Likelihood-ratio statistics on cross-equation restrictions;   (2)  
[ ]: P-value. 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
As we can see in Table 4, the estimated coefficients of the error correction term, i.e., the 
long-run reaction, show that Catalan municipalities converge toward the inter-temporal 
budget constraint. A higher deficit has a positive impact on revenues and a negative 
impact on expenditures. On the revenue side, not only do own-source revenues react to 
an increase in the deficit, but grants do also. Thus, the adjustment is carried out 
simultaneously by municipalities and by upper tiers of government.  
Table 4: Estimates for the error correction term  
Equation γ  
  
Own Revenues (R) 0.294***     (0.102) 
Expenditures (E) -0.523***   (0.164) 
Grants (G) 0.358***    (0.149) 
Debt service (DS)  0.021**      (0.010) 
  
Notes: (1) Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(2) ***, ** & * = statistically significant at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. 
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Table 5 reports the present value of the GIRFs12 computed from the estimates of the 
VECM13 by fixing the discount rate at 3% and considering a ten-year period14. The top 
panel in Table 5 reports the responses of all the components to a shock of each of them 
(thus allowing the adjustment to be made to the variable that has experienced the shock 
too), while the bottom panel presents the response to a permanent increase in one of the 
variables for all the other variables.  
 
Table 5: Present value generalized impulse response functions  
 Innovation to: 
Response of: R E G DS 
     
Own Revenues (R)    -0.709***     0.085** -0.018 0.515* 
 (0.038) (0.042)     (0.016) (0.286) 
 Expenditures (E)  0.261***     -0.729***  0.289*** -0.080 
 (0.036) (0.027)    (0.049) (0.496) 
Grants (G)    -0.007     0.158***  -0.726*** 0.229 
 (0.046) (0.047)     (0.062) (0.332) 
Debt service (DS)     0.024    -0.027      0.003     -0.450** 
    (0.015)    (0.017)     (0.008)     (0.129) 
     
Response to permanent increase 
     
Own Revenues (R)  0.314** -0.066 0.776* 
  (0.047) (0.041) (0.169) 
Expenditures (E) 0.896***  1.055*** -0.121 
 (0.029)  (0.030) (0.220) 
Grants (G) -0.026 0.583***  0.345 
 (0.036) (0.035)  (0.301) 
Debt service (DS) 0.082 -0.099 0.011  
 (0.078) (0.063) (0.016)  
Notes: (1) Generalized Impulse Response Functions, GIRF (Pesaran and Shin, 1998).  
(2) Bootstrap standard errors: 100 replications with replacement. (3) ***, ** & * = statistically 
significant at the 99, 95 and 90% levels. 
 
                                                 
12 Each column of the table shows the present value response of all fiscal variables to a shock 
recorded in a given fiscal variable. Each row in the table captures how responsive a given fiscal 
variable is to shocks to itself and to other fiscal variables. 
 
13 Table A1 in the appendix reports the estimated coefficients used to compute the GIRFs.  
 
14 We report the generalized impulse-response function considering a 10-year period since the 
GIRFs show that at that point all the adjustment has been realized. After that point, the GIRFs 
are nearly flat lines. As a robustness check we have also computed the GIRFs considering a 20-
year period and obtained substantially the same results. We have also computed the present 
value of the GIRFs with different discount rates and the qualitative results do not change 
significantly. This can be explained by the fact that the largest share of the adjustment takes 
place quite quickly during the first few years of the period considered. 
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Main results. Several of our results are to be remarked. First, a 1€ positive (negative) 
shock15 to own-source revenues is followed by a reduction (increase) in future own 
revenues of 71 cents16 and an increase (decrease) in future expenditures of 26 cents 
(first column of Table 5). Grants and debt service do not react to an innovation in own 
revenues. If we sum up the reaction of own revenues and expenditures, we estimate that 
an additional euro of own revenues offsets 97 cents in the primary surplus. In the 
Spanish case, therefore, grants do not play any role in offsetting own-source revenues 
losses, while the adjustments that follow a deficit attributable to a revenue shortfall are 
borne entirely by the municipalities themselves. This is at odds both with the U.S., 
where grants offset 9 cents of own-source revenue shocks (Buettner and Wildasin, 
2006), and with Germany, where equalization grants offset 15 cents of the shock 
(Buettner, 2007). This might reflect the low equalization power of the main 
unconditional grant that Spanish municipalities receive (Suárez, 1999; Bosch and Solé-
Ollé, 2005) as well as the fact that many of the grants are earmarked as capital grants, 
the sum of which has to be matched by a municipality’s resources. 
 
Second, the GIRFs also predict that an innovation to grants (third column) will be 
balanced by the response of the variable that experiences the shock, i.e. grants and 
expenditures. The response of own-source revenues to an innovation to grants is very 
low (just 2 cents, explaining 7% of the permanent increase), providing evidence of a 
very strong flypaper effect, which has been already obtained for Spain using different 
methodologies (e.g., Solé-Ollé, 2001; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2005). This result also 
differs markedly from that reported for the U.S. –where own revenues offset 14 cents of 
a grant shock and represented roughly a quarter of the adjustment–, but is more similar 
to that reported for Germany, where the revenues offset 4 cents of the innovation in 
grants (9% of the permanent increase). The several constraints operating on local taxes 
in both countries might explain this result. 
 
                                                 
15 Note that having computed the GIRFs, we do not then analyze the effect of a shock on one 
fiscal variable assuming that the other fiscal variables remain constant, but rather we take into 
account the correlation between the fiscal variables.  
 
16 This means that the level of own-source revenues, after the adjustment process, is 29 cents 
above the level before the shock occurred.  
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Third, when a 1€ innovation affects expenditures, the budget is balanced by a 73 cents 
reduction in future expenditures and by an increase of 8 and 16 cents in future own-
source revenues and grants, respectively. So, while higher tiers of government play no 
role in absorbing revenue shocks, their role is of paramount importance in the 
adjustment that follows an expenditure shock. Once again, this result is extreme: own-
source revenues in Spain play a similar role to that reported in Germany (where they 
offset 6 cents of an expenditure shock), but they have much less influence than in the 
U.S. (where they offset 16 cents of the shock). In the U.S. and Germany, however, 
grants play the same role in offsetting expenditure shocks (8 cents, approximately), 
which is much lower than in the Spanish case. Here again this might be due to the 
nature of intergovernmental grants in Spain. On the one hand, the main driver of 
unconditional grants is weighted population, with weights rising steeply with population 
size. On the other hand, capital grants are disproportionally allocated to municipalities 
facing population growth pressures (Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008), since these 
jurisdictions are the ones that can most readily justify the inadequacy of past facilities. 
Thus, in Spain, spending shocks arising from urban growth are partially offset by the 
higher tiers of government.  
 
Fourth, we observe that a great share of the fiscal adjustment (70%) is held by the future 
value of the fiscal variable that experiences the shock. This figure is very similar to 
those reported in the case of spending for the U.S. and Germany. However, revenues 
and grants are less volatile in Germany (57% and 55%) and, particularly so, in the U.S. 
(35% and 47%). The higher volatility of Spanish local own-source revenues could be 
due to the fact that although the three main local taxes are quite stable (recall that these 
are the property tax, the business tax and the motor vehicle tax), this might not be the 
case of other taxes and user charges which are more closely linked to the real estate 
cycle (i.e., construction tax, tax on land transactions, building permits, etc.). In the case 
of grants, this might reflect the impact of capital grants, which are highly volatile, since 
they are not automatic.   
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Fifth, given this strong reversion effect, it could be interesting to compute the response 
to a 1€ permanent increase in each fiscal variable17. As we can see at the bottom of 
Table 5, a 1€ permanent increase in own-source revenues is basically followed by a 
spending decrease of a similar magnitude (recall that the other effects - top panel - were 
not statistically significant). Spanish grants, thus, provide less insurance than their 
German counterparts (34% of the permanent increase), but also even less than U.S. 
grants (13%). A permanent increase of 1€ in spending is followed by an increase in 
own-source revenues and grants of proportions 1/3 and 2/3. Note again that this 
suggests that higher tiers of government match local resources in a 2 to 1 proportion in 
order to finance additional expenditure needs, which we speculate are related to the 
urban expansion process. This proportion is just 1 to 1 in Germany and 1 to 2 in the 
U.S.. Intergovernmental grants in Germany and, especially, in Spain seem to be quite 
biased towards funding additional local expenses (particularly compared to the U.S. 
case). This might have generated, at least in the Spanish case, a moral-hazard problem, 
with municipalities having the incentive to undertake excessive expansion since 
additional capital spending will always be financed (at least in the long run) by higher 
tiers of government (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2008). Finally, a permanent increase in 
grants leads to a higher level of spending, a situation that also occurs to a great extent in 
Germany, though not in the U.S.. 
 
Additional results. In order to clarify the above results, we have performed some 
additional analyses. To save space, we only discuss the most interesting results and 
report the coefficients referred to in Table 6. First, we re-estimated the VECM including 
time effects so as to capture the common innovations in fiscal variables. Hence, in this 
case, the parameters estimated only describe the adjustment of budget components to 
idiosyncratic shocks. The estimated coefficients of the error correction term and the 
present values of the GIRFs show that Catalan municipalities converge toward the 
intertemporal budget constraint, also when they experience an idiosyncratic shock, with 
estimates of the error correction parameter that are very similar to those obtained earlier. 
Thus, it seems that the viability of local financial systems does not depend on the type 
of shock (common or idiosyncratic) experienced.  
                                                 
17 We compute the response to a permanent increase dividing the GIRF by the permanent 
component of the innovation. That is, in the case of a shock to own-source revenues, we divide 
the estimated response of the other fiscal variables by (1-0.709). 
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Table 6: Present value generalized impulse response functions: selected coefficients 
 Innovation to own revenues Innovation to expenditures 
Response of Grants Current Grants(2) 
Capital 
Grants(2) Grants 
Current 
Grants(2) 
Capital 
Grants(2) 
Own 
revenues(2) 
All sample -0.007 0.008 -0.015* 0.158*** 0.042* 0.117*** 0.085** 
 (0.046) (0.051) (0.009) (0.047) (0.025) (0.041) (0.042) 
Small mun(1) -0.038* -0.011* -0.019** 0.178*** 0.038* 0.141*** 0.038** 
 (0.023) (0.006) (0.009) (0.039) (0.021) (0.039) (0.019) 
        
Response of Idiosyncratic innovation to own rev.
 (3) Idiosyncratic innovation to expenditures(3) 
Response of Grants Current Grants 
Capital 
Grants Grants 
Current 
Grants(2) 
Capital 
Grants(2) 
Own 
revenues(2) 
All sample -0.054* -0.015* -0.023** 0.213*** 0.038* 0.169*** 0.087** 
 (0.029) (0.009) (0.011) (0.052) (0.023) (0.045) (0.041) 
Small mun(1) -0.074*** -0.027* -0.021*** 0.226*** 0.040* 0.189*** 0.066*** 
 (0.031) (0.015) (0.009) (0.054) (0.022) (0.049) (0.028) 
Notes: (1) Each cell in this row has been obtained by estimating the model with a different sample; (2) 
The coefficients of current and capital grants has been estimated from a model which includes both 
variables at the same time; (3) Results obtaining after controlling for time-effects. 
 
Second, we do not observe substantial differences in the adjustment pattern following 
an idiosyncratic shock. It should only be mentioned that grants are slightly more 
responsive to an idiosyncratic shock than to shocks that affect all the municipalities. For 
example, we show in Table 6 how a 1€ positive (negative) idiosyncratic innovation in 
revenues is followed by a statistically significant reduction (increase) of 5 cents in 
grants (recall that the response to general shocks was nearly zero), and a 1€ positive 
(negative) idiosyncratic innovation in expenditures is followed by an increase (decrease) 
in grants of 21 cents (recall that this was just 16 cents in the case of a general shock). In 
the case of revenues, this should be interpreted as evidence that the overall amount of 
grants to municipalities does not respond to the evolution in overall local tax revenues18, 
but that grants do respond (to some extent) to revenue shocks that are specific to a given 
municipality. In the case of capital grants, this might occur because a municipality 
dedicates greater efforts in applying for project grants after a revenue shortfall; in the 
case of current grants, this might be due to the equalization component, which despite 
its obvious shortcomings, could play some role in insuring against asymmetric shocks. 
                                                 
18 If grants tend to offset idiosyncratic shocks rather than general shocks, they should 
increase/decrease after a common positive/negative revenue shock. Note, for instance, that in 
Spain, the overall pool of unconditional grants to municipalities is indexed to the growth of 
central government revenues (see Suarez, 1999), which means that unconditional grants tend to 
fall during a downturn (when both municipal and central revenues decline). So, without 
significant ad-hoc interventions to provide more resources to the local sector, it is quite natural 
to see a decrease in the overall amount of grants during a downturn, exacerbating the pro-
cyclical nature of local own-source revenues.  
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This result might also be due to very ad-hoc interventions by the central government in 
terms of their providing help to certain municipalities with revenue difficulties. 
 
Third, given the importance of grants in the adjustment process we have estimated the 
VECM disaggregating grants in current and capital grants19. We observe in Table 6 that 
capital grants are more responsive than current grants. For example, when expenditures 
experience a 1€ shock, capital grants increase by 12 cents whereas current grants only 
increase by 4 cents. This difference, in absolute values, is even greater when we scale 
the response of grants by their quantitative importance. On average, capital grants 
provide around 1/3 of total resources granted. The importance of the reaction of capital 
grants is even higher in the case of an idiosyncratic shock (17 vs. 4 cents).  
 
Fourth, since the adjustment pattern can be conditioned by the institutional 
environment, we have replicated the analysis considering only the smaller 
municipalities. In Spain, the institutional environment across municipalities varies with 
population size20. We qualify a municipality as small if it has less than 5000 inhabitants. 
We have fixed this as our threshold in order to obtain a representative sample of 
municipalities with the same institutional environment. Moreover, around 85% of 
Spanish municipalities have less than 5000 inhabitants21. The main difference between 
the two samples is the slightly higher response of grants to shocks affecting small 
municipalities. Thus, the role of upper tiers of government in the fiscal adjustment 
process is more important in small municipalities than it is in their larger counterparts. 
As Table 6 shows, when own-source revenues experience a 1€ shock in a small 
municipality, future grants fall 4 cents (7 cents in the case of an idiosyncratic shock). A 
positive 1€ expenditure shock in a small municipality implies an increase in future 
grants and own-source revenues of 18 and 4 cents, respectively (23 and 7 cents in the 
presence of an idiosyncratic shock). The importance of the upper tiers of government in 
                                                 
19 In general, the qualitative results provided by the estimation when adding one new variable 
are similar, although the precision of the estimates is not as great. Detailed results are available 
upon request. 
 
20 We identify the following four institutional environments depending on the size of the 
municipality’s population: i) 5000 or fewer; ii) more than 5000 but fewer than 20000; iii) more 
than 20000 but fewer than 50000; and iv) more than 50000 inhabitants.  
 
21 In our sample 148 (of the 258) are small municipalities. We did not perform the analysis 
separately for the other institutional environment as we had few observations for each sample. 
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the case of small municipalities could reflect a combination of factors. First, they have 
lower maximum ceilings on tax rates, which serve to constrain any reaction they might 
make through using their own-source revenues. Second, capital investment might be 
more volatile in small municipalities, due to the lumpiness of capital improvement 
projects. Third, they will almost certainly experience greater difficulties in obtaining 
credit. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have traced the dynamic adjustment process of local budgets in Spain. 
We have found that municipalities do adjust after a budget shock, and manage to 
balance their budgets after a period of some years. Municipalities respond to revenue 
shocks by adjusting both revenues and spending, with intergovernmental grants being of 
limited importance and only then in the case of idiosyncratic shocks. Grants do not 
seem to insure the entire local sector against revenue shocks, although they can provide 
some coverage for asymmetric shocks. The level of insurance is similar (but lower) to 
that provided in the U.S. but is quite at odds with the situation in Germany. Clearly, by 
not being insured against revenue shortfalls, Spanish municipalities might not face the 
perverse incentives to abuse overly volatile sources of revenue (i.e., the local business 
tax) identified by Buettner (2007). Despite their high degree of autonomy, Spanish local 
governments have managed to keep the deficit under control, so that the system does in 
fact appear viable.  
 
The adjustments made following an expenditure shock are, however, of a quite distinct 
nature. Here, grants play a more prominent role than own revenues, which contrasts 
markedly with the situation in Germany (where the two play a largely similar role) and 
in the U.S., where own-source revenues play the main role. We have shown that this 
reflects the greater reliance on ear-marked capital grants in Spain. Thus, while Spanish 
municipalities are perfectly autonomous and quite capable of funding their current 
spending, they are highly dependent on intergovernmental assistance when it comes to 
funding their capital spending. It might be argued, however, that most Spanish 
municipalities are too small to avoid being credit constrained and, as such, they need 
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capital grants to fund their infrastructure projects. If this is indeed the case, the 
intervention of higher tiers of government is vital to ensure the viability of local 
government. We show, however, that while it is true that smaller municipalities are 
more dependent on grants to make adjustments to their budgets, their behavior does not 
differ that markedly from that of the larger municipalities. Finally, we speculate that this 
greater reliance on grants might have given rise to another type of moral-hazard 
problem: additional infrastructure needs generated by population growth are 
disproportionately funded by higher tiers of government, inducing municipalities to 
foster urban expansion without considering the full fiscal consequences of these policies 
(Solé-Ollé and Viladecans, 2007). 
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Detailed estimation results for the basic model 
 Rit Eit Git DSit 
     
Dit-1 0.294***    -0.523*** 0.358**        0.021** 
       (0.101)    (0.164)      (0.149)       (0.010) 
     
Δ Rit-1 -0.453***    -0.348**       0.230        0.008 
       (0.099)    (0.162)      (0.141)       (0.011) 
Δ Eit-1       -0.218***    -0.476***      -0.313**       -0.002 
       (0.084)    (0.145)      (0.142)       (0.010) 
Δ Git-1 0.307***    -0.214      -0.499***       -0.004 
       (0.086)    (0.144)      (0.143)       (0.009) 
 Δ DSit-1       -1.055    -0.281      -0.115        0.011 
       (0.666)    (0.897)      (0.670)       (0.174) 
     
Δ Rit-2 -0.252***    -0.485***      -0.022   0.028*** 
       (0.094)    (0.160)      (0.123)      (0.009) 
Δ Eit-2       -0.159**    -0.068       0.007      -0.024*** 
       (0.072)    (0.110)      (0.103)      (0.008) 
 Δ Git-2        0.195**    -0.203*      -0.390***       0.013* 
       (0.076)    (0.116)      (0.120)      (0.007) 
 Δ DSit-2       -0.019     0.674     -0.685      -0.101 
       (0.623)    (0.845)     (0.734)      (0.074) 
     
Δ Rit-3       -0.132***    -0.321***     -0.076       0.007 
       (0.051)    (0.112)     (0.098)      (0.007) 
Δ Eit-3       -0.061     0.008      0.024      -0.006 
       (0.045)    (0.072)     (0.083)      (0.005) 
Δ Git-3        0.093*    -0.192**     -0.268**      -0.000 
       (0.050)    (0.080)     (0.104)      (0.004) 
 Δ DSit-3        1.524***     3.108***      1.021      -0.075 
       (0.433)    (0.985)     (0.699)      (0.085) 
     
Constant      45.897***   17.739*    38.837*** 17.194*** 
       (4.943)    (9.133)    (7.180) (1.231) 
     
Obs.       3,870     3,870      3,870 3,870 
R-squared      0.325     0.425      0.463 0.085 
     
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
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